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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 8, 1982 Conference 
Summer List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 82-52- (f X 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMM., et 
al. (employer) 
v. 
NORRIS, et al. (employees) 
'7 
Cert to CA9 (Goodwin, Poole; Nielsen, 
dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely (w/ ext'n) 
SUMMARY: A voluntary deferred compensation plan allowed retiring 
employees to choose between three forms of payments, including an 
annuity bought by petrs from independent insurance companies who use 
J 
sex-based actuarial tables. The question is whether the employer has 
violated Title VII by offering this option. 
j 
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FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: This case was decided on stipulated 
facts. Petr allows employees to enroll in a State Deferred 
Compensation Plan. The Plan, which is voluntary, works in two phases. 
During the "accumulation phase," employees may contribute as much of 
their pay check as they wish to one of a large variety of investment 
options. The employees pay no tax on the money put into the Plan and 
pay no tax on the money earned by the investment until it is 
distributed. This portion of the plan treats both sexes equally and 
is not under attack. Upon retirement, employees enter the "pay-out" 
phase of the Plan and must choose one of three options for the 
repayment of their deferred compensation. They may (1) have it 
returned in a lump sum (which they can then use, for instance, to buy 
the best annuity they can find), (2) receive a specific sum each month 
for a fixed number of months, or (3) receive a life annuity which 
petrs buy from an independent insurance company. The insurance 
companies providing option {3) 1 use sex-based mortality tables showing 
that women as a class live to receive more annuity checks than men as 
a class receive. As a consequence, men receive higher monthly annuity 
payments than women recieve. From the point of view of tax deferral, 
!however, option {3) is the best for both sexes. 
Claiming that option {3) violates the Fourteenth Amendment and, 
under the reasoning of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 u.s. 702 {1978), Title VII, resp brought an action on 
1There is some confusion in the record on this point. Petrs 
claim that the parties have stipulated that there are no 
insurance companies in Arizona who offer annuities based on 
unisex tables. Resp claims that it~ly ;st1pulated~hat all 
companies designated as funding media by petr, Ariz. Governing 
Committee for Tax Deferred Compensation Plans, use sex-based 
tables. 
hchalf of hcroclf and other wom~n cncollcrl in the Plan, seeking to 
~njofn pctro Ctom offering a n"x d-bns~d annuity, and to require pctrn 
to augment the annuity checks of those retired women who chose option 
(3). The oc (Cordova) certified the class, rejPcted petrs' arguments 
that Title VII is not violated by a voluntary plan or by a plan 
containing nondiscriminatory options, and gr.antcd injunctive relief. 
In addition, the DC directed that retired female employees be paid 
tt., J~ .. "'" r 
~qual annui.ty payments to ~men who accumulated the same deferred 
incomc. The Fourteenth Amendment claim was rejected, however, on the 
ground that reap failed to prove purposeful discrimination. 
on appeal, petrs challenged both the finding of a Title VII 
violation and the relief ordered. On the violation point, petrs 
reiterated the defenses asserted below, and additionally argued that 
the DC's decision unduly interfered with the state's right to regulate 
the insurance business~ that Title VII requires proof of intent, which 
is lacking since petrs did not themselves create the sex-based annuity 
scheme; that Manhart is limited to self-insured employers; that petrs' 
Plan falls within the "open market" exception to Manhart ("Nothing in 
our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an employer to set 
aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let each 
/retiree purchase the largest benefi.t which his or her accumulated 
contributions could command in the open market," 435 u.s. at 717-18); 
and that petrs are not responsible for the discrimination in the Plan 
because the options merely ~fleet the limits in the marketplace. l 1cA9 
affirmed. On the regulatory issue, the~~ reasoned that since the 
decision below dealt only with the ability of the employer to offer 
its employees discriminatory fringe benefits, it did not unduly 
interfere with the insurance business. It found that resp showed as 
much intent as Manhart required, that the existence of an option 
1 
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within the •onDn oarke~· excep•-1"on ·~.~.~ •he Pl~ • - ~ · c· r-- _  .., - . ..n s vo-...:.:-.t.a::y n.a _u re c~ 
not cure the Title V!I violation since w~en are entit:ec to t.he s~e 
!benefit options as cen; anc tnat Title VII protec~s aga:nst a.;: 
. 
employer' affirrnatively adopting any discri~inatory scbe~e, even i~ i ~ 
is the only one available in the :carketplace. Most. sign:::cant:y, in 
reliance on language in Manhart saying tha·t •an e!:!p:oye:: ::a:: ::1ot} 
avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory ?=os=~~s to 
corporate shells,• 435 U.S. at 718 n.33, CA9 held that Jo'..an'ha::t is ;not 
limited to employer-operated pension schemes, but rather app:ies eve:-. 
when an employer buys annuities from independent companies. 
Petrs' challenges to the award were also rejected. Noting cases 
in CAl and DC's in NY, Cal, Mich, and Or. ordering pa~~ents by 
•passive abusers," CA9 held that the order directing payment to 
retired employees was not an abuse of discretion. It rejected a Tenth 
Amendment challenge on the ground that Title VII was enacted under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thus giving Congress the power to intrude on the 
functioning of the states. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs claim that this decision extends Manhart to 
ban use of sex-based mortality tables by independent insurance company 
despite clear language in that opinion stating that Title VII was not 
"intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries," 435 
u.s. at 717 and swallows the "open market" exception carved out in 
Manhart since it prohibits the employer from going to the open market 
to buy for the employee the best option available. The decision 
ignores the fact that the Plan was voluntary and that the employer has 
no control over the insurance industry's methods of operations. CA9 
dealt incorrectly with the issue of intent. Furthermore, the relief 
granted violates the Tenth Amendment under National League of Cities 
'v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1973). 
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Resp argues that the case involves a staightforward application 
of Manhart and that other courts considering contentions similar to 
petrs' have agreed with CA9. 
Four amici briefs were also received. The American Council of 
Life Insurance makes it clear why the insurance industry feels that 
this decision will have a tremendous impact on the insurance business. 
The Council claims that Manhart had little (or no) effect on the 
industry because it involved an unpopular fringe benefit (employer-
operated annuities). By finding Title VII liability when an employer 
goes out and buys annuities for its employees, this case addresses a 
popular fringe benefit that affects 99% of the pension industry. 
Moreover, insurance companies cannot by most states' laws 
discriminatorily offer only to employers annuities calculated on 
unisex tables. But if they offered both options to everyone, the 
insurance companies would soon be insolvent because women would choose 
to buy unisex annuities, which give them higher monthly payments for a 
lower price, while men would choose annuities based on men-only 
mortality tables since that would maximize their benefits. Without 
men signing up for unisex insurance, that option would be unstable 
because there would be no men paying in more and receiving less to 
subsidize the women who receive more. To make a long argument short, 
this decision will require all insurance companies to use ONLY unisex 
tables, which is a result Manhart claimed it was not mandating. 
The Academy of Actuaries agrees with the above reasoning. It 
notes that it is possible that Congress intended this result when it 
enacted Title VII, but thinks that since the result was not foreseen 
by the Manhart Court, cert should be granted to reconsider the Manhart 
decision before lower courts blithely require the entire industry to 
change its methods of operation. 
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The National Association of Insurance Commissioners argues that 
lower courts' extention of Manhart has le~d to the federalization of 
the insurance industry, which is a reversal of the long-standing 
practice of reserving its regulation to the states. The Court should 
grant cert in order to decide whether this result is desirable. 
The State of California and its Teachers' Retirement Association 
has filed a brief because it is involved in another case where it is 
making the same arguments rejected by CA9 in this case. 
DISCUSSION: The Conference should consider this case with Calif. 
v. Retired Public Employees' Ass'n, No. 82-262, also on this list. 
Both cases demonstrate the problems encountered in applying Manhart. 
While none of the parties point to conflicts among the circuits, the 
Court may want to examine the insurance industry's claims about the 
dire results of the many decisions in this area. If cert is granted, 
it should be limited to the question whether Manhart applies to 
employers who purchase insurance from independent companies and 
perhaps to the question whether there is a defense in the fact that 
~ the marketplace did not offer nondiscriminatory choices.2 The intent 
question is well settled (discriminatory impact is all that is 
required). The contentions based on the voluntary nature of the plan 
and the existence of nondiscriminatory options are simply variations 
on the familiar "separate but equal" argument. The Tenth Amendment 
issue borders on frivolous. 
There is a response and four amicus briefs. 
September 20, 1982 Dreyfuss Op'ns in pet'n 
2 
I assume that the stipulations are in the record, and that the 
Court would request the parties to reproduce them in order to 
resolve the factual dispute referred to in note 1. 
